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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Appellee, i 
V • 1 
ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS i 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
t Case No. 920693 CA 
t Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Robert Alan Phillips pled guilty on June 16, 
1980 to first degree murder, a capital felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978) and aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). 
He now appeals from a denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly determine that defendant 
pled guilty to first degree murder voluntarily and with a clear 
understanding of the charge, including the element that the 
1 
killing was intentional? An appellate court "will not disturb a 
trial court's determination that a defendant has failed to show 
good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea unless it clearly 
appears that the trial judge abused his discretion." State v. 
Truiillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991); accord 
State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All provisions upon which the State relies are set out 
in the body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1980, Defendant was charged with first degree mur-
der , a capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-202 
(1978) and aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) (R. 15, 23-24). 
Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing 
where seven witnesses testified (R. 20-21; State's Exhibit 14-S, 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing [hereinafter "Prelim."] i-ii). 
Defendant pled guilty to murder in the first degree and 
aggravated robbery (Defendant's Exhibit 1-D, Transcript of Plea 
Hearing and Penalty Phase [hereinafter "Plea Tr."] 1-24). He was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment on the 
murder conviction and a term of not less than five years for the 
aggravated robbery conviction (R. 222) (Addendum A). No appeal 
was taken. 
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In 1992, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea (R. 227-34 ).* The trial court filed a Memorandum 
Decision and Order denying the motion on May 12, 1992 (R. 252-56) 
(Addendum B). Defendant's Notice of Appeal was timely filed on 
June 5, 1992 (R. 257-58). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 10:30 p.m. on New Year's Day, 1980, defendant 
sat in a friend's apartment and filed a notch in the handle of 
his .357 revolver (Prelim. 61, 123, 148). He had killed Everett 
Hamby, Jr. about an hour and a half earlier (Prelim. 146, 148). 
The facts surrounding the killing were fleshed out at the prelim-
inary hearing, the plea hearing, and the sentencing hearing. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Defendant's friend, Kendall Northern, gave the follow-
ing account of the killing at the preliminary hearing: 
On January 1, 1980, defendant and Northern hailed a cab 
in Salt Lake City (Prelim. 116, 123). They drove around for 
about an hour and a half, discussing among other things the 
personal and family life of the Mr. Hamby, the cab driver (Pre-
lim. 137). 
At one point defendant experienced or feigned sickness 
(Prelim. 135). After the cab stopped, defendant got out, pulled 
the cab driver's door open, pointed a revolver at him, and told 
1
 So far as the State can determine from the record, this 
motion related only to the charge of first degree murder, not 
aggravated robbery. 
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him to get out and lie down behind the cab, which he did (Prelim. 
138). Defendant removed some money from the cab driver's pock-
ets. The driver offered no resistance (Prelim. 139-40). Defen-
dant then walked approximately five feet away, raised and braced 
his revolver, and shot the driver (Prelim. 142). About 30 sec-
onds later, defendant shot the driver two more times (Prelim. 
143). 
With the gun in one hand and the money in the other, 
defendant got in the passenger side of the cab and counted the 
money (Prelim. 143-44). There was $26 (Prelim. 144). 
Northern testified that defendant said that if Northern 
said anything about the crime defendant would kill him, and if 
defendant was "busted," i.e., jailed, "he had people that could 
kill me" (Prelim. 144). 
The two dropped the car off near Trolley Square and 
wiped off the prints (Prelim. 145). Back at Northern's apart-
ment, defendant notched his gun handle. It was the second notch 
(Prelim. 148). 
The day after the shooting, defendant read a newspaper 
account of the shooting. In fact, "he cut it out and said he 
ought to call the paper because it wasn't accurate" (Prelim. 
166). Defendant "bragged about how he shot him once behind the 
ear and he said the paper said he shot him in the back and he 
said he ought to call the paper because he didn't shoot him in 
the back, he shot him in the side" (Prelim. 166-67). 
4 
In addition to Norther's testimony, Dr. Monique Ryserf 
assistant Utah State medical examiner, testified that any of the 
three shots, "by themselves, taken alone, could have been fatal" 
(Prelim. 102, 112). 
PLEA HEARING 
The plea hearing was held on June 16, 1980 before the 
Honorable Christine M. Durham. Defendant was present and repre-
sented by two defense counsel, Glenn Iwasaki and Fred Metos (Plea 
Tr. 1). The prosecutor read into the record a document setting 
forth the terms of the plea bargain (Plea Tr. 2-3). This docu-
ment, entitled Stipulation as to Understanding with Respect to 
Plea, was later signed by both defense counsel, the trial prose-
cutor, and the Salt Lake County Attorney (R. 214-15). The stipu-
lation provided that defendant would plead guilty as charged in 
the information and that the prosecution would advise the court 
that the case was one for which capital punishment might be 
legally justified, but would not make "an impassioned plea for 
the imposition of the death penalty" (Plea Tr. 3; R. 216). 
At the plea hearing Mr. Iwasaki stated, "Mr. Metos and 
I have spent considerable time with Mr. Phillips regarding the 
ramifications of his entry of the plea and also the ramifications 
of the possible penalty he is facing" (Plea Tr. 4). He indicated 
that a plea affidavit had been prepared and discussed with defen-
dant "in detail" (Plea Tr. 4-5). 
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The court questioned defendant at length.2 The fol-
lowing is excerpted from the plea colloquy: 
THE COURT: All right. Can you explain 
to the court in your own words why you have 
decided to plead guilty to these charges? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I feel that it is 
being the best of justice [sic], actually. 
THE COURT: How is it in the best inter-
est of you is what I am concerned about. 
THE DEFENDANT: I am going to get some 
assistance in furthering my education or 
helping myself, to better myself, whereas I 
can help others. 
MR. IWASAKI: That is not the question, 
Mr. Phillips. The question was in light of 
everything that we have all discussed, and in 
light of your involvement in this matter, why 
are you changing your plea to guilty rather 
than retaining a not guilty posture? Why are 
you pleading guilty today? 
THE DEFENDANT: I am not sure. 
MR. IWASAKI: Did we not discuss what the 
State was going to do at the penalty phase is 
to not ask for the death penalty, per se, by 
at least putting in facts before the court as 
to what they believed the facts to be? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
MR. IWASAKI: Did we not discuss that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, we did. 
MR. IWASAKI: And is the Information that 
— Is that one of the reasons why you are 
changing the plea, because the county attor-
ney's office has stated that they would not 
demand that you be executed? 
2
 Pages 1-15 of the plea transcript contain the entire plea 
colloquy. They are annexed hereto as Addendum "C." 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
MR. IWASAKI: But rather, submit it to 
the court? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. That is true. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Phillips, did you ~ 
MR. METOS: May I also add, Your Honor,— 
You are also aware, Robert, of the state 
of the evidence and we have discussed the 
chances of your being found guilty of a less-
er offense and being found guilty of the 
offense that is charged? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yah. We have gone 
through that. 
THE COURT: All right. After having gone 
through that with your counsel, Mr. Phillips, 
do you have an opinion about the evidence 
against you? Do you think that you are like-
ly to be convicted of the greater offense? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am, 
I do. 
THE COURT: All right. And we will be 
spending considerable time, I think, review-
ing that evidence, although, as I understand 
it, the defendant's plea is entered. 
And Mr. Phillips, I need you to indicate 
to me if you are entering your plea of guilty 
because you are in fact guilty of the offens-
es that are charged in the Information. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I am. 
THE COURT: All right. Specifically, the 
Information alleges that on or about January 
1st, 1980, here in Salt Lake County, you 
caused the death of Everett Hamby, Jr. while 
you were engaged in the commission of an 
aggravated robbery? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Are those facts true and 
correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. And did you cause 
his death knowingly and intentionally at that 
time? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not intentionally. It 
was accidental. But I was still at fault. 
THE COURT: All right. 
With respect to the intentional part, I 
will need a proffer from counsel respecting 
the facts that exist to establish intent. 
THE IWASAKI: Your Honor, the facts would 
indicate that Mr. Hamby was shot once in the 
back of the head, a bullet going from right 
to left in an area about a centimeter above 
the top of his ear, exiting approximately — 
atop of his right ear, exiting approximately 
the middle of the temporal bone on his left 
ear. 
Further, the evidence will show, and Mr. 
Phillips has subsequently confessed to the — 
that a second and third shot were placed into 
the body by Mr. Phillips. 
Based upon Mr. Phillips' inability to 
explain the reasons why the second and third 
shot were fired, it is our opinion, Mr. Metos 
and myself, that, with a hurdle to pass, the 
facts would indicate an intentional nature, 
although in Mr. Phillips' own mind there is 
some question as to whether or not the first 
shot was intentional. However, the other two 
shots, the unexplainability of those other 
two shots, would indicate from circumstantial 
evidence his [sic] intentional nature of 
them. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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Mr. Phillips, do you disagree in any way 
with what Mr. Iwasaki has said about what the 
evidence would show? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. 
In Count II of the Information you are 
charged on the same day with having unlawful-
ly and intentionally taken personal property 
from the possession or the control of Everett 
Hamby, Jr. against his will by the use of 
force or fear. Do you admit to those facts 
as well? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. And do you admit 
to the intent with respect to those facts? 
Do you acknowledge that you intended to take 
the property from his possession with the use 
of force or fear or a firearm? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. I would like you 
now to sign that affidavit that is before you 
on the podium that Mr. Iwasaki has prepared 
and that we have discussed here, and I want 
you to sign it as an indication, number one, 
that you have read it; number two, that you 
understand its contents; number three, that 
everything that is in its contents is true 
and accurate and correct as far as you know; 
and number four, and most important, that 
your decision to enter this plea of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made, that nobody's 
threatened you or promised you anything ex-
cept what we have talked about, the State not 
arguing strenuously, and that you desire to 
plead guilty yourself. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Are all of those things true? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, they are. 
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THE COURT: All right. Would you sign 
the affidavit now in open court, please. 
MR. IWASAKI: Sign your full name. 
(Defendant complies.) 
MR. IWASAKI: As previously stated, Your 
Honor, Mr. Metos and myself and [the prosecu-
tor] have signed this already. 
THE COURT: All right. May I see it? 
(Affidavit submitted to the court.) 
THE COURT: Although I don't ordinarily 
require the formality of having the witness 
sworn in connection with the affidavit, I 
think in this case I would prefer to do that. 
MR. IWASAKI: I would agree, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Would you raise your right 
hand, please, Mr. Phillips. And what I want 
you to do i[s] take an oath on the record 
with respect to the truthfulness of your 
statements as contained in this affidavit. 
THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear the 
testimony you are about to give in the matter 
now before the court will be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you, God? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Phillips, you are now formally and 
officially under oath, and I would like you 
to reaffirm your answer to the questions 
which I have just asked you; namely, does 
your signature on this affidavit represent 
the fact that, number one, you have read it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Number two, that you under-
stand it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
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THE COURT: Number three, that its con-
tents are true and correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And number four, that your 
decision to plead guilty is made of your own 
free will and choice? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very 
much. 
Having heard the defendant's affirmation 
of his now sworn statements in the affidavit, 
and having reviewed the affidavit, based upon 
its contents and his re[s]ponses to my ques-
tions here in open court, I find that his 
plea of guilty to two charges, one of crimi-
nal homicide, murder in the first degree, and 
one of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, is freely and voluntarily made. I 
will order that it be accepted and entered in 
the record of the court. 
(Plea Tr. 5-10, 13-15). 
The affidavit signed and ratified under oath by defen-
dant (Addendum "D") states in paragraph 12: 
I have read this affidavit, or I have had it 
read to me by my attorneys, and I know and 
understand its contents. I am 26 years of 
age, have attended school through the 12th 
grade and I can read and understand the 
[E]nglish language. I have discussed its 
contents with my attorneys and ask the court 
to accept my plea of guilty to the charges 
set forth above in this affidavit because I 
did, in fact, on the 1st day of January, 
1980, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of 
Everett Hamby, Jr. while I was engaged in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to 
commit Aggravated Robbery; and that on or 
about the 1st day of January, 1980, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, unlawfully and 
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intentionally take personal property in the 
possession of Everett Hamby, Jr. at or near 
2700 West 900 South, from the person or imme-
diate presence of Everett Hamby, Jr., against 
his will, by the use of force of [sic] fear, 
and in the commission of same did use a fire-
arm. 
(R. 213-14) 
SENTENCING HEARING 
At the sentencing hearing, the Court received proffers 
of evidence from the State and the defense (Plea Tr. 151). 
The State proffered expert ballistics testimony to the 
effect that the first shot was fired from 24 to 30 inches away 
from the victim; that any one of the three bullets would have 
killed the victim; that the bleeding from the second and third 
gunshot wounds was consistent with cardiac activity continuing 
for a brief period after the first shot; and that the chances of 
surviving the first shot were "probably nil" (Plea Tr. 166-67). 
The prosecutor indicated that the State was initially 
concerned that the shooting might indeed have been accidental 
(Plea Tr. 171). For this reason the State requested Northern to 
submit to a polygraph test. The test suggested that Northern had 
lied about certain facts, but was inconclusive because of a heart 
condition from which he suffered (Plea Tr. 171-72). The prosecu-
tor stated that the prosecution team was "very concerned," since 
M[o]f course, we didn't want to ask [for] the death penalty if 
there was any possible chance that Mr. Phillips had accidentally 
discharged that weapon into Mr. Hamby" (Plea Tr. 173). 
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Confronted with that polygraph result, Northern con-
fessed his involvement (Plea Tr. 174). He also confessed that he 
and defendant "discussed in some detail the possibilities of a 
robbery" and that defendant had indicated "that if a robbery went 
down they would in all probability have to shoot the witness, 
because Mr. Phillips didn't want any witness around to testify 
against him later on" (Plea Tr. 175-76). 
The prosecutor reported that the polygraph "indicates 
that Mr. Northern did not see that first shot fired" (Plea Tr. 
180). However, the first shot went into "the most vital portion 
of the person's body . . . traversing from right to left across 
the most vital areas of his brain and killing him." The prosecu-
tor added, "The odds and probabilities of that on an accidental 
discharge in a fashion of which Mr. Phillips was robbing Mr. 
Hamby leads me to believe that the first shot was aimed . . . " 
And of course, there was "no question that the second and third 
shots were intentionally fired" (Plea Tr. 181). Ballistics tests 
also indicated "a well aimed [first] shot" (Plea Tr. 191; see 
also Plea Tr. 192-195). 
The prosecutor represented that defendant had brought 
with him a "black toilet paper roll" described by defendant as a 
silencer (Plea Tr. 183). However, the State stipulated that it 
was not used in the killing (Plea Tr. 271). 
Defense counsel responded to this proffer. Mr. Iwasaki 
admitted that defendant "did fire those shots, and under circum-
13 
stances which would lead one to believe that it was intentional 
and knowing" (Plea Tr. 199). He also attempted to discredit 
Northern's testimony (Plea Tr. 199-200). While not challenging 
the prosecutor's proffer, he cautioned the court that it was an 
oral proffer and urged the court "to look at all of the facts and 
circumstances, including the preliminary hearing tremscript" 
(Plea Tr. 203). In addition, he argued that the facts of the 
case were "subject to different inferences and interpretations" 
(Plea Tr. 205). 
The defense also called five prominent defense attor-
neys, a deputy county attorney, a psychologist who had evaluated 
Mr. Northern, and numerous family members. Except for the psy-
chologist, who testified that Northern was a manipulative anti-
social personality (Plea Tr. 212), these witnesses' testimony 
related to the death penalty and defendant's personal life. 
At the conclusion the proffers and testimony, the court 
entered on the record its findings regarding aggravation and 
mitigation (Plea Tr. 302-09). With respect to the intentional 
nature of the killing, the court found as follows: 
Third, there is substantial evidence in 
this case to show that the shooting was in-
tentional , and not accidental as claimed by 
the defendant. Most of those factors which 
show the intentional nature of the act rather 
than its accidental occurrence I have already 
described fsee Plea Tr. 301-03]. 
They have to do with the planning and the 
discussion by the parties of the crime, the 
existence and presence of the silencer on the 
person of the defendant on the evening of the 
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crime, the failure of the parties to hide 
their identification for the substantial 
period of time they were with the victim; 
The fact that the defendant was out of a 
job and needed money, the fact that there 
were three shots fired, all of them in deadly 
locations on the victim's body, the fact 
which is undisputed, that the gun was loaded 
and the defendant's finger was on the trig-
ger, that the victim was unarmed and coopera-
tive; 
The fact that the pressure needed to cause 
that gun to fire in its double action phase 
was at least 12 pounds, as my recollection of 
the evidence shows, the wipe-up of the fin-
gerprints in the cab, fingerprinting and 
reloading of the gun, and the purchase of the 
shoulder holster the following day, the day 
following the crime, for purposes of carrying 
it more conveniently, the notch on the han-
dle, and the newspaper article which I have 
already described. 
(Plea Tr. 303-04, emphasis added). 
The court sentenced defendant to a term of life impris-
onment for the capital homicide and five years to life for the 
aggravated robbery (R. 222). The judge penned the following com-
ment to the Board of Pardons on the Judgment and Commitment form: 
This defendant deliberately and unnecessarily 
murdered an innocent victim for $26.00, and 
attempted to convince the court that the act 
was accidental. I hope that he will not be 
released on parole after the statutory fif-
teen years, but that he will in fact serve a 
sentence which more closely resembles "life 
imprisonment." 
(R. 223, emphasis added) (see Addendum "A"). 
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MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
The record on appeal does not include a transcription 
of the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.3 The motion was apparently based primarily if not wholly 
on the transcript of the plea hearing, which was admitted into 
evidence (R. 250)/ Therefore, no facts were adduced at this 
hearing in addition to those summarized above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to set aside his guilty plea to first degree murder. 
This contention rests upon two stated grounds: (1) that defendant 
was not informed of potential defenses; and (2) that there was 
insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt. 
Defendant offers no facts, argument, or analysis in 
support of his first contention. This Court should therefore 
disregard it. 
3
 It is well settled in this jurisdiction that H[i]£ an 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [a 
reviewing court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings 
below." Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) (quot-
ing State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986)), cert, denied 
493 U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990). 
* The record does not reflect that the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing was admitted into evidence, although it is 
included in the record on appeal. The State requests this Court 
to take judicial notice of its contents pursuant to Willett v. 
Barnes, No. 900344, slip op. at 4 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992) (Court 
took judicial notice of preliminary hearing transcript not in-
cluded in the record on appeal). 
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In pressing his second contention, defendant ignores 
the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented or proffered in the 
preliminary hearing and the district court. Because he fails to 
marshal this evidence, his sufficiency argument fails. 
Defendant's attempts to distinguish North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970) are unavailing. Like 
Alford, defendant pled guilty in the face of strong evidence of 
guilt. However, while Alford asserted his innocence under oath, 
defendant admitted his guilt under oath. 
Finally, defendant's reliance upon State v. Brecken-
ridcre, 688 P.2d 440 (1983) is misplaced. Unlike that case, here 
the State produced overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. 
Furthermore, the issue of intent was exhaustively explored at the 
plea and sentencing hearings. Defendant admitted his guilt under 
oath and the court made findings to support its conclusion that 
the killing was intentional. 
Judge Durham was careful to ensure that defendant's 
guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by substantial 
evidence of guilt. The trial court carefully reviewed this 
evidence and rendered its decision in a thoughtful and thorough 
memorandum decision. There was no abuse of discretion here. 
17 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE IN 1980 DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY VOLUN-
TARILY AND WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
CHARGE, THE TRIAL COURT IN 1992 PROPERLY 
DENIED HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA 
"A plea of guilty • . . may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-6(2)(a) (1990). A "withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privi-
lege/ not a right . . . [and] is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court." State v. Gallecros, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 
1987). 
Defendant has not clearly articulated the legal basis 
for his claim on appeal. He does not cite the federal or state 
constitutions, and he admits that rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, does not control.5 The State will therefore treat 
his appeal as premised solely upon section 77-13-6(2)(a)'s "good 
cause" requirement. 
Good cause exists where a plea was entered involuntari-
ly or without a clear understanding of the charge. State v. 
Thorup, No. 920404-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Nov. 13, 1992). 
Defendant argues good cause based upon two contentions: (1) that 
5
 Defendant's original motion relied upon rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and cases construing it (R. 232-
33). However, defendant now concedes that since he pled guilty 
on June 16, 1980, and the rule did not become effective until 
July 1, 1980, rule 11 does not control (Br. of App. 9; see also 
R. 242-43 [State's memorandum]; R. 253-54 [Memorandum Decision]). 
See Hallidav v. United States. 394 U.S. 831, 833, 89 S. Ct. 1498, 
1499 (1969) (federal rule 11 is inapplicable to pleas entered 
before its effective date). 
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defendant was not informed of potential defenses; and (2) that 
there was insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt. 
A. Defendant Waived Any Issue Involving 
Potential Defenses. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not 
permitting defendant to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground 
that "defendant was not fully informed of his defenses" (Br. of 
App. 6). However, defendant has never fully articulated this 
argument. He has never identified the defenses of which he 
should have been informed, nor has he cited any authority requir-
ing the court to inform him of them. 
Where a brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authori-
ty to support [an] argument," a reviewing court "must disregard 
this issue." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
See also State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State 
v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990). This Court 
must accordingly disregard defendant's first point on appeal. 
B. The State Proffered Overwhelming Evidence 
of Defendant's Guilt. But Defendant Fails 
to Marshal It. 
In its memorandum decision denying the motion to with-
draw, the court relied upon Strong v. Turner. 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 
P.2d 323 (Utah 1969) as the authority controlling at the time of 
defendant's guilty plea (R. 253-54). Strong required that a 
guilty plea be made "voluntarily" and "with a clear understanding 
of what the charge is . . . " 22 Utah 2d at 296 & 296 n.2, 452 
P.2d at 324 & 324 n.2. Based on the facts set forth above, the 
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court concluded that "the court [accepting the plea] was able to 
determine defendant was admitting an intentional act notwith-
standing his earlier claim of accident" (R. 254). 
Defendant asserts that "the proffer of evidence prod-
uced regarding the facts that existed does not establish intent" 
(Br. of App. 9). Consequently, he argues, "there would have been 
no reason for Defendant to plead guilty to murder when it was not 
committed, unless he believed through misapprehension of nature 
and element of crime [sic], that he had committed it intentional-
ly" (Br. of App. 11). 
This argument is in effect a sufficiency challenge to 
the trial court's ruling. In order to mount such a challenge, an 
appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial 
court's verdict and then demonstrate that "the evidence, includ-
ing all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 
P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Chavez, No. 910723-
CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. Oct. 22, 1992). 
In 1980, the State presented and proffered overwhelming 
evidence of defendant's guilt and of his understanding of the 
intent issue. The trial court was aware of the intent issue when 
it accepted defendant's plea and held his sentencing hearing. It 
ensured that defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to 
an intentional killing and that the evidence against him was 
strong (see pp. 5-12 herein). The court reviewed the transcript 
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of the preliminary hearing and heard detailed proffers of the 
evidence against defendant, including evidence of his intent to 
kill (see pp. 12-14 herein). Finally, Judge Durham entered in 
the record extensive findings of fact on this very issue, con-
cluding that the killing was intentional (see pp. 14-16 herein). 
In 1992, the trial court found that "defendant's volun-
tary and knowing plea of guilty was verified on the record in an 
exchange between the defendant and the court" (R. 254) (Addendum 
"B"). It further found that the plea affidavit "was a crucial 
and inextricable part of the colloquy," and that "[b]y inquiring 
of the defendant two separate times about the affidavit, the 
court was able to determine defendant was admitting an intention-
al act notwithstanding his earlier claim of accident" (id.). 
Finally, the trial court found that "[ejven after defendant 
indicated the death was accidental and not intentional, he re-
peated his concurrence with his counsel's view that evidence of 
intent existed" (R. 255). 
Because defendant fails to marshal or even acknowledge 
these findings and the extensive evidence supporting them, he 
falls short of demonstrating the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
C. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Proper Under 
North Carolina v. Alford. 
As a "wholly independent basis" for its ruling, the 
trial court relied upon North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 
S. Ct. 160 (1970). Alford testified at his plea hearing "that he 
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had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty 
because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do 
so." 400 U.S. at 28, 91 S. Ct. at 162-63. The United States 
Supreme Court held that "an express admission of guilt . . . is 
not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal 
penalty." A guilty plea may be constitutionally entered where "a 
defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require 
entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains 
strong evidence of actual guilt." 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 
167; see also Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989) ("an 
accused can lawfully plead guilty to an offense for which he 
could not have been convicted if the plea is in exchange for a 
lesser sentence"). The court found that defendant, after consul-
tation with his counsel, acknowledged that he would likely be 
found guilty of first degree murder (R. 255). 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Alford on the ground 
that "there is no strong evidence of guilt" in his case (Br. of 
App. 7). Again, this is essentially a sufficiency challenge in 
which defendant fails to marshal the supporting evidence as 
required by Moosman and Chavez. His claim therefore fails, 
It fails on the merits as well. At the preliminary 
hearing, at the plea hearing, and at the sentencing hearing, the 
State presented and proffered overwhelming evidence of defen-
dant's guilt (see pp. 3-15 herein). Unlike Alford, who asserted 
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his innocence under oath, defendant admitted his guilt under oath 
(see pp. 10-12 herein). 
In view of defendant's desire to plead guilty and the 
strong evidence of guilt before the trial court, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Alford provides a 
sufficient basis for defendant's guilty plea. 
D. State v. Breckenridge Does Not Assist 
Defendant. 
Finally, defendant's reliance upon State v. Brecken-
ridge , 688 P.2d 440 (1983) on appeal is misplaced. First, this 
is a new argument, asserted for the first time on appeal (see R. 
227-34), and should be rejected on that ground alone. State v. 
Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). 
Second, Breckenridge is inapposite. Although Brecken-
ridge pled guilty to arson, the only facts presented to the trial 
court indicated that Breckenridge accidentally started the fire. 
The supreme court stated, "the record recites no factual basis 
from which we might conclude that an arson ever occurred." 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443. On the contrary, the facts sug-
gested that Breckenridge had no reason to plead guilty other than 
a mistaken belief that he had committed the crime. Id. The 
court held that Rule 11(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution required with-
drawal of the plea. Id. at 444. 
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Defendant here has not asserted a constitutional viola-
tion and rule 11 does not apply. But factual differences between 
the two cases run deeper even than these legal ones. 
The State here presented or proffered overwhelming evi-
dence that defendant intentionally killed Everett Hamby. Even 
defense counsel admitted that defendant "did fire those shots, 
and under circumstances which would lead one to believe that it 
was intentional" (Plea Tr. 199). Defendant knowingly pled guilty 
in order to reduce the risk of receiving the death penalty, as is 
his right. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 28, 91 S. Ct. at 162-63. 
Most significantly, the court receiving Breckenridge's 
guilty plea failed to make an explicit record finding that Breck-
enridge understood the nature and elements of arson. Id. at 443. 
Here, defendant raised the intent issue in the plea hearing. The 
trial court exhaustively explored it with counsel and with defen-
dant; inquired into why defendant was pleading guilty; questioned 
whether he agreed that there was evidence of intent and that he 
would probably be found guilty; had him personally affirm in open 
court the contents of his plea affidavit, then repeat his answers 
under oath; and entered findings supporting its conclusion that 
the killing was intentional. 
In sum, the record is replete with evidence of defen-
dant's guilt and with evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily 
entered his plea of guilty. Two district judges have reached 
these conclusions without difficulty. On this record, the defer-
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ential review required by State v. Trulillo-Martinez, 814 P. 2d 
596, 599 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 
424 (Utah 1987) is amply merited. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on November 25, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
)ROS< JR. 
distant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
Judgment and Commitment (1980) 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: GREGORY L. BOWN 
Deputy County Attorney 
C-220 Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 535-6130 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs 
ROBERT PHILLIPS ^ £>
T 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
Case No. CR-80-296 
On the 23rd day of June, 1980, appeared Michael J. Christensen, the 
attorney for the State of Utah, and the defendant appeared in person and by 
counsel, Glenn K. Iwasaki and Fred Metos. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon a plea of 
guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital 
offense, as charged in Count I of the Information; and upon a plea of guilty of 
the offense of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, as charged in 
Count II of the Information; and the Court having asked if the defendant has 
anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause 
to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and con-
victed. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the 
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of life imprisonment, and is not 
fined as provided by law for the crime of Criminal Homicde, a capital offense, as 
charged in Count I of the Information; and that the defendant be confined and 
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than 
five years and which may be for life, and is not fined as provided by law for 
the crime of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, as charged in Count II 
of the Information. Commitment shall issue forthwith. Such sentences to run 
concurrently. 
IT IS ORDERED that N. D. Hayward, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, take the said defendant, Robert A. Phillips, and deliver said 
defendant without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where said 
defendant shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in accordance with 
this Judgment and Commitment. n J * 
DATED this /fT day di3^\%^. 
BY THE COURT 
ATTEST 
W. STERLING EVANS 
,Cl£RK 
CHRISTINE M. DURHAM, Judge 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-35-21, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, and in accordance with the guidelines developed conjointly 
between the Courts and the Board of Pardons, I recommend that the defendant 
serve^/7 A*y?A27£Z ^ClMontiW)prior to release or parole. iZ*l ^z/l/x23 /$Z rfL o ti'&j prior le 
Imprisonment is ordered in deviation from the guidelines because 
Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
T^de&ndartr ^ ^ ^ t ^ ^ ^ / ^^^^7UC€< 
^7 &3<ro£>3 
fa pat4&arffr>i r ^ 
DATED this * / s / " day of. H 1980 
THE COURT %m^-
CHRISTINE M. DURHAM, Judge ^€^t/C^Sf 
-r„rf,rm*nt and Commitment this 26th day Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment and co 
rt „« K iwasaki and Fred Metos. Attorneys for Defendant, 
of June. 1980, to Glenn K. IwasaKi ana 
333 South 200 East. Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion 
to Withdraw Plea (1992) 
By-£$2k 
HAY 1 2 1S32 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
y C;*.X 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, 
Defendant* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO- 801902961 
Defendant Robert Alan Phillips has moved to withdraw his 
1980 plea of guilty to first degree murder, a capital offense, 
and aggravated robbery. Defendant's focus is on the first of 
the two charges. The State promised not to make an impassioned 
argument for imposition of the death penalty in exchange for 
defendant's plea of guilty to the first degree murder charge. 
At a hearing on June 16, 1980, the plea arrangement was 
presented to the district judge. An inextricable part of the 
proposed plea was defendant's affidavit which was apparently 
prepared for him by counsel. In the affidavit the defendant 
stated he knew the State must prove each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt (para. 3), admitted his guilt generally (para. 
C002f2 
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6), and specifically admitted that he intentionally and 
knowingly caused the death of the victim (para. 12). 
During the colloquy with the judge, defendant denied he 
intentionally caused the death of the victim asserting that the 
death was accidental. Defendant's counsel immediately 
indicated that there was evidence from which intent could be 
inferred. The Court then asked the defendant if he disagreed 
with his counsel/s comment on the evidence. Defendant's 
response was unequivocal: "No". (Tr. pp. 9-10). It was only 
after this specific colloquy that the court made inquiry of the 
defendant concerning the affidavit. The defendant orally 
verified he had read the affidavit, understood its contents, 
that the affidavit was true and accurate and that his plea 
decision was voluntary. Only after this oral verification did 
the defendant sign the affidavit. The court then had the 
defendant sworn and he again stated he had read the affidavit, 
understood its contents, that the affidavit was true and 
correct and that his decision to plead guilty was voluntary 
(Tr. 14-15). 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was enacted in 
the 1980 legislative session and was not effective until July 
1, 1980. Laws of Utah. 19890 Ch. 14, Section 1. As a 
000253 
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consequence, it is inapplicable to the plea in this case which 
was entered June 16, 1980. The applicable standard was 
articulated in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323, 
324 (1969). There the Court indicated that a plea must be made 
voluntarily and with a clear understanding of the charge. As 
required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), defendant's 
voluntary and knowing plea of guilty was verified on the record 
in an exchange between the defendant and the court. The 
affidavit of defendant was a crucial and inextricable part of 
the colloquy. By inquiring of the defendant two separate times 
about the affidavit, the court was able to determine defendant 
was admitting an intentional act notwithstanding his earlier 
claim of accident. 
There is a wholly independent basis not presented by the 
State to deny the motion to withdraw the plea. Before the 
court engaged the defendant in the above-referenced colloquy, 
the defendant in response to a question from his counsel 
confirmed that he was pleading guilty because the State would 
then agree not to demand the death penalty (Tr. p. 8). The 
court then asked the defendant whether he believed, after 
consultation with counsel, that it was likely he would be 
convicted of the capital offense. Defendant's response was an 
Cn0254 
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unequivocal "yes". (Tr. 8). Even after defendant indicated 
the death was accidental and not intentional, he repeated his 
concurrence with his counsel's view that evidence of intent 
existed. (Tr* pp. 9-10). 
These facts are remarkably similar to those in North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) where the defendant 
entered a plea of guilty while not factually acknowledging 
guilt in order to avoid the death penalty. Under those 
circumstances and where there was strong evidence of guilt, the 
Court found the plea to be a voluntary and knowing one. In the 
instant case the defendant confirmed his counsel's view that he 
would likely be found guilty of the capital offense. As a 
consequence, defendant's plea was appropriate. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea is denied. 
Dated this /2 dav of May, 1992. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ' 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order, to the 
following, this JJL ^ citav of May, 1992: 
Walter R. Ellett 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul Gotay 
Attorney for Defendant 
5085 S. State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Z..d^£ 
r"C256 
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Plea Colloquy (1980) 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, JUNE 1 6 , 1 9 8 0 ; 1 1 : 5 3 A.M. 
- o O o -
THE COURT: We will go on the record in the case of The 
State of Utah vs. Robert Alan Phillips, Criminal No. CR80-296, 
Is it Phillip or Phillips? 
MR. IWASAKI: Phillips, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let the record show he is present in the 
courtroom represented by counsel, Mr. Iwasaki and Mr. Fred 
Metos. The State of Utah is represented by Mr. Michael 
Christensen. 
Are there any other appearances? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Leon Dever for the State also, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very mch. 
This matter was scheduled to begin a trial today; 
however, I understand from discussions of counsel that an 
arrangement for the entry of a plea has been discussed and 
negotiated between the parties and that the court's approval 
for that arrangement will be sought here today. Is that 
correct? 
MR. IWASAKI: That is correct, Your Honor. We intend 
at this time to have Mr. Phillips move the court to allow us 
to withdraw our previously entered pleas of not guilty to the 
crimes of criminal homicide, murder first degree, and aggra-
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vated robbery, murder — aggravated robbery a first degree 
felony, to enter pleas of guilty to the charges as contained 
in the Information. 
THE COURT: All right: 
MR. IWASAKI: Prior to that, I believe the State would 
like to orally proffer to the court a stipulation which will 
be reduced to writing, which we will return to the court at 
1:30, as to arrangements concerned with the plea. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I will. Your Honor. We are in the 
process right now of doing an informal document for the court. 
But essentially, the plea, the stipulation, the understanding 
with respect to the plea, would read as follows: 
Comes now the State of Utah, by and through myself 
and Ted Cannon, and hereby agrees that in exchange for the 
defendants plea of guilty as charged in the Information the 
State agrees to act as following in the penalty phase of the 
above-entitled matter: 
1. The State will submit to the trial judge all 
statements, reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, and all 
other documentary evidence, including affidavits as the par-
ties deem appropriate, for full and fair consideration of the 
appropriateness of the penalty of death in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. In addition to the above, the State will 
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present to the court all evidence it finds relevant concern-
ing both guilt and aggravation; 
3. Will indicate to the court what the State 
finds to be the natural inferences and consequences of the 
factual matters presented both orally or with respect to the 
matters submitted in pursuance of Paragraph 1. 
4. We will advise the court that in the opinion 
of the State the case is one for which capital punishment may 
be legally justified, but the State will not make an 
impassioned plea for the imposition of the death penalty, 
rather that such a matter is appropriately left to the dis-
cretion of the court based upon the submitted evidence of 
guilt of aggravation and mitigation, 
5. The State will answer all inquiries of the 
court as candidly as possible and as consistent as possible 
with the above paragraphs. 
Dated and signed. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Are we prepared, then, to discuss the entry or the 
change of the defendants plea in the entry of his plea of 
guilty here today? 
MR. IWASAKI: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: ^Thank you. 
I think the defendant had better come forward. 
Mr, Iwasaki and Mr. Metos, as the defendant's 
1 || attorneys, I would like to ask you a few questions before I 
2 || question the defendant respecting his entry of the plea. 
3 11 MR. IWASAKI: Certainly. 
4 THE COURT: Have you explained to the defendant fully 
5 and completely, "to the best of your ability, the nature of the 
6 charges that have been lodged against him in this matter? 
7 MR. IWASAKI: I am satisfied, in my opinion, that Mr. 
8 Metos and I have spent considerable time with Mr. Phillips 
9 regarding the ramifications of his entry of the plea and also 
10 the ramifications of the possible penalty he is facing. 
n In that regard. Your Honor, I have taken the 
12 liberty to prepare an affidavit for the defendant which is 
13 similar to those that we have used consistently in the court, 
u with minor changes. One of the changes which I would like to 
15 indicate to the court at this time, and of which Mr. Phillips 
16 is aware, is regarding the paragraph on appeal rights, waiving 
17 II the rights on appeal. 
18 || Mr. Phillips does understand that he is waiving 
19 his rights as to his guilt by entry of this plea. However, as 
20 the constitutional ramifications of the Utah death penalty 
21 statute, I believe that is still an open question, and Mr. 
22 Phillips, it is his understanding that he will preserve his 
23 rights as to those constitutional issues on the death penalty, 
24 but does in fact waive his right to an appeal as to the guilt 
25 aspect of it. 
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With the minor changes, we have gone over this 
affidavit of the defendant with Mr. Robert Alan Phillips in 
detail. I have previously affixed my signature, as has Fred 
Metos and Michael Christensen, the prosecuting attorney. 
I believe Mr. Phillips is fully aware of what is 
contained in that affidavit and at this time knows what all is 
occurring before Your Honor. And any questions that he has, I 
think, have been fully answered and discussed by both Mr. 
Metos and myself. 
Fred, do you have anything to add for the record? 
MR. METOS: No, I don't. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Iwasaki. Based upon that, I would now like to ask the defend-
ant a number of questions. 
Mr. Phillips, I would like to know first how old 
you are and how much education you have. 
THE DEFENDANT: I am 26, and I have got a GED. I went 
through the tenth grade and was in the eleventh when I quit. 
THE COURT: All right. And do you read and understand 
the English language? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Without any problems? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Have you had an opportunity to 
read through the affidavit that Mr. Iwasaki has prepared for 
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your use in these proceedings? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I did. 
THE COURT: Do you believe that you understand the 
contents of that affidavit? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a number of 
rights, if you take these charges to trial before a jury, that 
are explained and discussed in that affidavit? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Specifically, I would like to 
inquire, inasmuch as you have apparently decided to plead as 
charged, whether you are aware that if you took these charges 
to trial that you would have the right to have the State 
required to prove to the jury's satisfaction each and every 
one of the essential elements of the charges beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. And you understand, further, 
that you would have rights to confront the witnesses against 
you and to have your counsel cross examine them on your 
behalf, and so forth? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Can you explain to the court in 
your own words why you have decided to plead guilty to these 
charges? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Well, I feel that it is being the best 
of justice, actually. 
THE COURT: How is it in the best interest of you is 
what I am concerned about. 
THE DEFENDANT: I am going to get some assistance in 
furthering my education or helping myself, -to better myself, 
whereas I can help others. 
MR. IWASAKI: That is not the question, Mr. Phillips. 
The question was in light of everything that we have all 
discussed, and in light of your involvement in this matter, 
why are you changing your plea to guilty rather than retain-
ing a not guilty posture? Why are you pleading guilty today? 
THE DEFENDANT: I am not sure. 
MR. IWASAKI: Did we not discuss what the State was 
going to do at the penalty phase is to not ask for the death 
penalty, per se, by at least putting in facts before the court 
as to what they believed the facts to be? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
MR. IWASAKI: Did we not discuss that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, we did. 
MR. IWASAKI: And is the Information that — Is that one 
of the reasons why you are changing the plea, because the 
county attorney's office has stated that they would not demand 
that you be executed? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
1 || MR, IWASAKI: But rather, submit it to the court? 
2 H THE DEFENDANT: Yes, That is true. 
3 11 THE COURT: All right. 
4 || Mr. Phillips, did you — 
5 || MR. METOS: May I also add, Your Honor, — 
6 II You are also aware, Robert, of the state of the 
7 evidence and we have discussed the chances of your being found 
8 guilty of a lesser offense and being found guilty of the 
9 offense that is charged? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yah. We have gone through that. 
11 THE COURT: All right. After having gone through that 
12 with your counsel, Mr. Phillips, do you have an opinion about 
13 the evidence against you? Do you think that you are likely to 
14 be convicted of the greater offense? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am, I do. 
16 THE COURT: All right. And we will be spending consid-
17 erable time, I think, reviewing that evidence, although, as I 
18 understand it, the defendant's plea is entered. 
19 And Mr. Phillips, I need you to indicate to me if 
20 you are entering your plea of guilty because you are in fact 
21 guilty of the offenses that are charged in the Information. 
22 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I am. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Specifically, the Information 
24 alleges that on or about January 1st, 1980, here in Salt Lake 
25 County, you caused the death of Everett Hamby, Jr. while you 
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were engaged in the commission of an aggravated robbery? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, 
THE COURT: Are those facts true and correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. And did you cause his death 
knowingly and intentionally at that time? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not intentionally. It was accidental. 
But I was still at fault. 
THE COURT: Jill right. 
With respect to the intentional partf I will need 
a proffer from counsel respecting the facts that exist to 
establish intent. 
MR. IWASAKI: Your Honor, the facts would indicate that 
Mr. Hamby was shot once in the back of the head, a bullet 
going from right to left in an area about a centimeter above 
the top of his ear, exiting approximately — atop of his right 
ear, exiting approximately the middle of the temporal bone on 
his left ear. 
Further, the evidence will show, and Mr. Phillips 
has subsequently confessed to the — that a second and third 
shot were placed into the body by Mr. Phillips. 
Based upon Mr. Phillips1 inability to explain the 
reasons why the second and third shot were fired, it is our 
opinion, Mr. Metos and myself, that, with a hurdle to pass, 
the facts would indicate an intentional nature, although in 
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Mr. Phillips f_CT^jminLtLJ:here Is $QT&€> . question ^as^Jig ythetheror 
not the first shot was intentional. However, the other two 
shots, the unexplainability of those other two shots, would 
indicate from circumstantial evidence his intentional nature 
of them. 
THE COURT: All right-
Mr. Phillips, do you disagree in any way with what 
Mr. Iwasaki has said about what the evidence would show? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, ma 1am. 
THE COURT: All right. 
In Count II of the Information you are charged on 
the same day with having unlawfully and intentionally taken 
13 II personal property from the possession or the control of 
H Everett Hamby, Jr. against his will by the use of force or 
15 fear. Do you admit to those facts as well? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma fam, I do. 
17 THE COURT: All right. And do you admit to the intent 
18 with respect to those facts? Do you acknowledge that you 
19 intended to take the property from his possession with the use 
20 of force or fear or a firearm? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Have you had a chance, Mr. 
23 Phillips, to discuss as fully and completely as you desire, 
24 your decision to plead guilty with your attorneys, Mr. Metos 
25 and Mr. Iwasaki? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I do. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice and the 
counsel that they have given to you? 
.THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the court now 
that you would like to discuss? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. I am specifically concerned that 
you understand that all the State has agreed to do in return 
for your guilty plea, and, frankly, it is not very much, they 
have not reduced the charges, they have not agreed even to 
stipulate to a lower penalty. All they have agreed to do is 
not strenuously argue in favor of the imposition of the death 
penalty. 
All right. Do you understand that their agreement 
not to argue strenuously in favor of the death penalty is in 
no way binding upon this court, and in fact could be entirely 
ignored by this court at the time of the sentencing phase of 
this proceeding, and that the court could, based on the evi-
dence before it, and in fact might impose the capital penalty 
that is provided by law; that is, the death penalty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. I understand that. 
THE COURT: All right. So you understand very clearly 
that all you are getting in return for this plea is the 
silence of the State? 
11 
1 || THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, 
2 || THE COURT: And that is only at the argument phase, 
3 II They are still going to put on evidence, as I understand it, 
4 || that would justify and substantiate the imposition of a death 
5 || penalty. 
6 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
7 THE COURT: "All right. Is there anything about your 
8 condition here today, Mr. Phillips, that might impair your 
9 ability to think carefully about this decision? Are you in a 
10 I good frame of mind? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
12 THE COURT: Do you understand what's going on? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
u THE COURT: Are you taking any drugs or medication for 
15 any purpose? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: I am taking medication to help me sleep 
17 at night. 
18 THE COURT: What is that? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: I couldn't tell you the name of it. I 
20 have been trying to get the name of the medication from the 
21 doctor. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Since I have been incarcerated. 
24 THE COURT: Does it affect your ability to function 
25 during the day at all? 
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THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. And do you believe you are in 
full control of yourself and your faculties here today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. I would like you now to sign 
that affidavit that is before you on the podium that Mr. 
Iwasaki has prepared and that we have discussed here, and I 
want you to sign it as an indication, number one, that you 
have read it; number two, that you understand its contents; 
number three, that everything that is in its contents is true 
and accurate and correct as far as you know; and number four, 
and most important, that your decision to enter this plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made, that nobody's threat-
ened you or promised you anything except what we have talked 
about, the State not arguing strenuously, and that you desire 
to plead guilty yourself. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Are all of those things true? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, they are. 
THE COURT: All right. Would you sign the affidavit now 
in open court, please. 
MR. IWASAKI: Sign your full name. 
(Defendant complies.) 
MR, IWASAKI: As previously stated, Your Honor, Mr. 
Metos and myself and Mr. Christensen have signed this already. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. May I see it? 
2 (Affidavit submitted to the court.) 
3 THE COURT: Although I don't ordinarily require the 
4 formality of having the witness sworn in connection with the 
5 affidavit, I think in this case I would prefer to do that. 
6 MR. IWASAKI: I would agree, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Would you raise your right hand, please, Mr. 
8 Phillips. And what I want you to do iw take an oath on the 
9 record with respect to the truthfulness of your statements as 
10 contained in this affidavit. 
11 THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are 
12 about to give in the matter now before the court will be the 
13 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
14 you, God? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
17 Mr. Phillips, you are now formally and officially 
18 [I under oath, and I would like you to reaffirm your answer to 
19 || the questions which I have just asked you; namely, does your 
20 signature on this affidavit represent the fact that, number 
21 one, you have read it? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma1am. 
23 THE COURT: Number two, that you understand it? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, roafam. 
25 11 THE COURT: Number three, that its contents are true and 
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correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And number four, that your decision to plead 
guilty is made of yo\ir own free will and choice? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma1am. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 
Having heard the defendant's affirmation of his 
now sworn statements in the affidavit, and having reviewed the 
affidavit, based upon its contents and his reponses to my 
questions here in open court, I find that his plea of guilty 
to two charges, one of criminal homicide, murder in the first 
degree, and one of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
is freely and voluntarily made. I will order that it be 
accepted and entered in the record of the court. 
Having done that, we need to move on to the sen-
tencing phase of the hearing. And the statute requires me to 
sentence you in no less than two nor more than ten days from 
today's date. 
I don't know whether the statute actually provides 
for a capital homicide hearing under these circumstances. 
Ordinarily that phase would begin immediately after the 
verdict and the entry of the verdict. 
MR. METOS: Well, as I read the capital sentencing phase 
statute, I think it is 76-302, says that upon conviction a 
hearing shall be held. It doesn't specify a time period. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Plea Affidavit (1980) 
GLENN K. IWASAKI [FlLfv-LDJ ^ ' " ^ " ^ 
G. FRED METOS e c ty' Utah 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. .....
 0 
Attorneys for Defendant JUN *£ 1980 
333 South 200 East
 w c , 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ^SlJ^** v ^ 3fiC,,L^ 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, 
Defendant, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. CR 80-296 
I, ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, the above named defendant, 
under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
guilty to the charges of CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, FIRST 
DEGREE and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY contained in the Information on 
file against me in the above-entitled court, a copy of which 
I have received. That I understand the charges to which this 
plea of guilty is entered are a capital crime and a felony of 
the first degree, and that I am entering such a plea voluntarily 
and of my own free will after conferring with my attorneys, GLENN 
K. IWASAKI and G. FRED METOS and with the knowledge and under-
standing of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right under 
the Constitution of Utah and the United States 
to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial 
upon the charges to which I have entered a 
plea of guilty, or to a trial by the court should 
I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have 
a right to be represented by counsel and that I 
am in fact represented by GLENN K. IWASAKI and 
G. FRED METOS as my attorneys. 
2. I know that if I wish to "have a trial in court 
upon the charges, I have a right to be con-
fronted by the witnesses against me by having them 
testify in open court in my presence and before 
the court and jury with the right to have 
those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. 
I also know that I have a right to have wit-
nesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense 
to testify in court upon my behalf and that I 
could, if I elected to do so, testify in court 
on my own behalf, and that if I choose not 
to do so, the jury can and will be told that this 
may not be held against me if I choose to have 
the jury so instructed. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the 
State must prove each and every element of the 
crimes charged to the satisfaction of the court or 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would 
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; 
and that any verdict rendered by a jury whether 
it be that of guilty of not guilty must be by 
a unanimous agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and 
of the United States that I have a right against 
self-incrimination or a right not to give evi-
dence against myself and that this means that I 
cannot be compelled to admit that I have com-
mitted any crime and cannot be compelled to 
testify in court upon trial unless I choose to 
do so. 
5. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that 
if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the 
court that I would have a right to appeal my 
conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of 
Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that 
if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me and to have the assistance 
-2- O'J021t 
of counsel on such appeal. However, it is my 
further understanding that while I am waiving 
my rights to appeal as to guilt, I still pre-
serve my right to appeal as to the con-
stitution ramifications of the Utah death 
penalty statutes. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of 
guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights 
as set out in the five preceding paragraphs 
and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating 
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crimes 
to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I know that under the laws of Utah the possible 
maximum sentence that can and may be imposed 
upon my plea of guilty to the charges identified 
on page one of this affidavit are: 
(A) Death or life imprisonment. 
(B) Imprisonment in the Utah State Prison 
for a term of not less than five 
years and not more than life. 
(C) And/or fined in any amount not in the 
excess of $10,000. 
And that the imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if 
my plea is to more than one charge. I also know 
that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting 
sentencing upon another offense of which I have 
been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, 
my plea in the present action may result in con-
secutiye sentences being imposed on me. 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea 
of guilty does not mean that the court will not 
impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment 
upon me and no promises have been made to me by 
anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead 
guilty or that it will be made lighter because 
of my guilty plea. 
9, No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to 
make me plead guilty and I am doing so of my 
own freewill and after discussing it my attorneys. 
I know that any opinions they may have expressed 
to me as to what they believe the court may 
do are not binding on the court. 
10. No promises of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty. 1 am also aware that any 
charge or sentencing concessions or recommendations 
or probation or suspended sentences, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or 
sought by either defense counsel or counsel for 
the State, is not binding on the court and may 
be approved and followed by the court. 
11. I am not now under the influence of either drugs 
or alcohol. 
12. I have read this affidavit, or I have had it read 
to me by my attorneys, and I know and understand 
its contents. I am 26 years of age, have attended 
school through the 12th grade and 1 can read 
and understand the english language. I have 
discussed its contents with my attorneys and ask 
the court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges 
set forth above in this affidavit because 1 did, 
in fact, on the 1st day of January, 1980, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, intentionally 
or knowingly cause the death of Everett Hamby, Jr. 
while [ was engaged in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit Aggravated Robbery; and 
that on or about the 1st day of January, 1980, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, unlawfully 
and intentionally take personal property in the 
possession of Everett Hamby, Jr, at or near 2700 
West 900 South, from the person or immediate 
presence of Everett Hamby, Jr., against his will, 
by the use of force of fear, and in the commission 
of same did use a firearm. 
DATED this I6>^ day of ^ll/xj£> , 1980. 
%*&az. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Court this 
day of CU/I/ 1980. 
A' 
r^JL AY/W?} M. DU 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
We certify that we are the attorneys for ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, 
the defendant named above and we know he has read the affidavit, 
or that we have read it to him, and we discussed it with him 
and believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents 
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
our knowledge and belief the statements, represertations and 
declarations made by the defendant in the for§gpj*j affidavj 
are in allrespects accurate and true. 
SNN K. IWASAKI 
Defense Attorney 
G. FRED M E T O S ( 
Defense Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its 
case against ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, defendant. I have reviewed 
the Affidavit of the Defendant and find that the declarations 
are true and accurate. No improper inducements, threats, or 
coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. 
The plea negotiations are fully contained in this affidavit 
or as supplemented on the record of the court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support the 
conviction of the defendant for the plea offered or for the 
greater offense as charged, and that acceptance of the plea 
TOiid serve the public interest. 
BASED UPON THE FACTS set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and 
Certification, the Court findsthe defendant's plea of guilty 
is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that 
defendant's plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT THIS /£>i% day of (././*// , 1980. 
0 
Of • '''^ 7 * ' 
(,4 xM/tf/7/, /Qr</r//tm CHRISTINE M. DURHAM 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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